Recent Arrivals of Migrants and Asylum Seekers by Sea to Italy: Problems and Reactions by Monzini, Paola
Area: Demography, Population & International Migration 
ARI 75/2011  
Date: 13/4/2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 1
 
Recent Arrivals of Migrants and Asylum Seekers by Sea 
to Italy: Problems and Reactions (ARI) 
 
Paola Monzini* 
 
 
Theme: The Italian government’s answer to the mass arrival of undocumented migrants 
and asylum seekers since the beginning of the present wave of political turmoil in North 
Africa must be seen in the context of both domestic political issues and international 
constraints. 
 
 
Summary: From the beginning of the present wave of political turmoil in North African 
countries and up to 8 April, 390 boats have arrived in Italy with a total of 25,867 
undocumented migrants and asylum seekers, most of them Tunisians. The Italian 
government’s answer has been framed by both domestic political issues, such as the 
extreme anti-migrant attitude of the Lega Nord, and by international constraints, such as 
the refusal of other EU members to receive irregular economic migrants and the difficulty 
in establishing a workable repatriation accord with Tunisia. Given the situation, the Italian 
government has been trapped in its own web, made up of contradictory positions and 
exaggerated forecasts concerning migratory flows. 
 
 
 
Analysis:  
 
The Problem 
In 2009 the Italian government promoted a steady hardening of the laws on irregular 
migration and new action to reduce it. A drop in the number of undocumented entries by 
sea was especially due to the enforcement of the agreements with Libya, and to the 
highly-criticised rejection of migrants and asylum seekers at sea.1 According to official 
data, irregular entries by sea declined sharply between May 2009 and January 2011. The 
total number of migrants apprehended at sea in 2009 was 9,573: a 74% decline 
compared with the total of 36,951 apprehended in 2008. However, only very general data 
for 2010 have so been issued by the government (in a leaflet).2 
 
In Italy the monitoring of irregular migration trends has become difficult for analysts: since 
2008 the Italian Interior Ministry has released no relevant data on the geographical 
location of new arrivals, the nationalities of migrants and the countries of return for those 
repatriated. 
 
                                                 
* PhD in Social and Political Sciences (IUE) and international consultant. 
1 The issue is currently under consideration at the European Court of Human Rights. See 
http://www.unhcr.it/news/dir/26/view/558/stop-ai-respingimenti-in-libia-55800.html, Unione Forense per la 
Tutela dei Diritti dell'Uomo, I respingimenti in alto mare al vaglio della Corte europea dei diritti dell'uomo, in 
http://www.unionedirittiumani.it/; http://www.messinanotizie.it/aperta-uninchiesta-sui-respingimenti-di-migranti-
nel-canale-di-sicilia.html (accessed 21/I/2011). 
2 See http://www.governoberlusconi.it/notizie/450-452/print.php?id=687 (accessed 3/IV/2011). 
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Always high on the political agenda in the previous years, in 2010 the problem of irregular 
migration by sea had almost disappeared from the public discourse. In the absence of 
data, and news, the strong media impact on public opinion of arrivals by sea declined 
substantially, while the view prevailed that the problem had almost been solved.3 
 
The situation suddenly changed on 9-12 February 2011, when over the course of three 
days almost 3,000 migrants arrived in Lampedusa as a result of the political and social 
instability in the Mediterranean area, particularly Tunisia. The number of crossings from 
post-revolutionary Tunisia to Italy was already on the increase in January, but not 
publicised in the press. A new migration wave had commenced when patrolling and 
prevention activities to prevent departures from the shores of Tunisia were inactive for a 
few days due to the lack of police forces. Even after the crisis, the enforcement of controls 
has not returned to previous levels. Moreover, after the political change, repatriation 
procedures from Italy have been suspended. 
 
Migration from Tunisia to Italy by sea continued throughout February and March. 
Meanwhile, migratory movements within the Mediterranean area became much wider. As 
the Libyan crisis flared up and civil war began, according to UN sources around 400,000 
migrant workers left Libya, while Tunisia was heavily affected as it accepted 200,000 
refugees at its borders. 
 
In Italy the sudden growth in the number of arrivals by sea forced the government to 
address the problem once again, particularly from mid-February onwards. Up to 6 April 
390 boats had arrived in Italy, with a total of 25.867 undocumented migrants and asylum 
seekers, mainly Tunisian. Up to 23,352 migrants landed in Lampedusa, almost all of them 
having been rescued by the Italian authorities at sea and disembarked on the island for 
routine checks.4 Only a few hundred landed in another small Pelagian island, Linosa, 
while others reached Sicily. In total, up to 6 April 10 boats had arrived from Libya. 
 
As reported in the press, the arrivals from Libya were asylum seekers of all ages, almost 
all Somali and Eritrean nations, while the Tunisian migrants were almost all young men 
driven by the lack of opportunities in their country. Generally they had a good level of 
education and their objective was to settle –permanently or not– in Italy, France, Germany 
or Belgium. Around 20% of them intended to claim asylum.5 According to information 
collected by the Italian journalists, the Tunisian migrants leave from Zarzis, Djerba and 
Kerkenna Islands, and pay from €700 to €1,400 to cross the sea. 
 
Migrants and asylum seekers sail in dinghies or boats to Lampedusa at great risk. 
Accidents and tragedies have occurred, some of them unrecorded: boats sink and dozens 
drown. It has been documented that since January at least 156 people have died in their 
attempt to cross the Sicily Channel. The latest accident was on 5 April and involved a boat 
carrying 450 Somali and Eritrean asylum seekers sailing from Libya, with up to 250 
deaths having been reported.6 
                                                 
3 Even if FRONTEX data show an increase in the course of 2010: from a total of 150 intercepted migrants in 
the first quarter of the year, to nearly 600 in the second quarter, and 2,157 in the third quarter. See 
http://www.frontex.europa.eu/situation_at_the_external_border/art22.html (accessed 3/IV/2011) 
4 
http://www.interno.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/sezioni/sala_stampa/notizie/immigrazione/000069_2011
_04_07_informativa_Maroni_alla_Camera.html (accessed 7/IV/2011). 
5 Cfr. Massimo Livi Bacci, Migranti irregolari in Italia: oggi dalla Tunisia domani dalla Libia?, www.neodemos.it, 
12/III/2011. 
6 La Repubblica, 7/IV/2011. 
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Responses at the national level 
Since mid-February 2011 ad hoc responses have been put in place by the Italian 
government to respond to the new situation regarding the arrival of irregular migrants by 
sea. 
 
The first public response of the Italian authorities essentially spread panic and fear 
through the media. The words and images used by Berlusconi and the Italian ministers 
from the beginning of the crisis, and up to 6 April, were highly charged, such as ‘exodus of 
biblical proportions’, ‘human tsunami’, ‘invasion’ and ‘black danger’. The Minister of the 
Interior also said that ‘we have never seen an emergency of this scale’. At the 
international level, the lack of assistance from the EU was also remarked upon several 
times by the country’s political leaders. 
 
On the practical side, on 13 February the Italian government declared a humanitarian 
emergency and, after some hesitation, decided to re-open the facility for 850 migrants in 
Lampedusa, which had been closed since October 2009. 
 
At the same time a special commissioner, the prefect of Palermo, was appointed, and a 
disbursement of €1 million was made, including funds needed to open a new centre for 
asylum seekers in Sicily (in Mineo), to gather asylum seekers from all over the country, 
although it has subsequently been heavily criticised.7 Also, in mid-February, the 
government decided to deploy 200 soldiers to assist in the management of migration 
flows. 
 
From 15 to 30 March no further initiatives were undertaken, while hundreds of boats were 
being tugged towards Lampedusa. Migrant arrivals continued to outnumber departures to 
the mainland. In a couple of weeks the island had filled up with newcomers, whose 
position was described as ‘desperate’ by the authorities on the island and by observers. 
 
At the end of March, the 5,000 Lampedusa residents protested against the deteriorating 
living conditions resulting from the massive inflows, and the unbearable sanitary and 
psychological problems they had to endure. When even the President of the Republic 
complained about the situation, and public order was almost impossible to maintain on the 
island, Berlusconi decided to intervene directly. His visit to Lampedusa on 30 March had 
extensive media coverage. He promised to relieve the pressure on the island and to solve 
the growing humanitarian crisis by a quick transfer of the migrants. More precisely, he 
promised to ‘liberate’ Lampedusa within 60 hours, shipping the migrants to other centres 
on mainland Italy. Also, he promised to promote the island’s image, as its economy is 
based on tourism and fishing, and to support the funding of new infrastructures. 
Berlusconi, in order to gain the residents’ trust, also announced that he would buy a villa 
on the island (which he has not done yet) and suggested that a golf club should be 
opened. 
 
After a delay because of bad weather, an Italian naval vessel along with three private 
ferries arrived in Lampedusa to transfer 4,000 migrants to Sicily and the mainland in a 
couple of days. 
 
                                                 
7 See http://thehubsicilia.wordpress.com/2011/02/22/sicilia-chiama-maghreb-e-mashreq/ and 
www.meltingpot.org/articolo16438.html (accessed 4/IV/2011). 
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At present the total capacity of holding centres throughout Italy is only 7,000.8 The press 
has reported on a plan to open new reception and first-aid centres in 15 of Italy’s 20 
regions. For the time being, no details about the geographical distribution of the migrants 
have been released, but it appears that most will be held in southern Italy. 
 
However, several meetings have been held with regional and local authorities and the 
location of new sites is still under discussion: an agreement was signed on 30 March but 
few solutions have so far been implemented.9 The Interior Ministry’s intention is to create 
a total capacity of 20,000 new places, mainly in new (temporary) facilities. 
 
In the meantime, while local and national authorities are seeking a collective agreement, 
camps made of tents and basic sanitary services have already been rapidly established to 
allow the transfer of migrants from Lampedusa. The biggest one is in Manduria (Puglia, 
southern Italy) and can hold up to 4,000 undocumented migrants. According to press 
releases, the camp does not comply with the basic rules for first-aid centres while 
migrants are unable to obtain legal aid or social assistance and translation services.10 In 
Manduria they must eat their food sitting on the ground, as there are no tables, and water 
is scarcity.11 NGOs are denied entry and, according to local witnesses, once migrants 
arrive they are deprived of their belongings: substantially, their human rights are not 
respected.12 
 
Living conditions in the new centres have been described as awful and escapes and 
revolts are habitual. In Manduria at least 700 migrants fled on Saturday 2 April after 
breaking down a fence; and on the same day 500 migrants escaped from the Mineo 
centre13 in Sicily in an attempt to reach a railway station. Some of them were later 
apprehended by the police. 
 
Responses at the International Level 
In mid-February the Italian Minister of the Interior complained about the lack of support 
from the EU and expressed the need for the burden to be shared at the European level. 
Moreover, on 15 February he asked the EU for FRONTEX to intervene directly and 
enforce European border controls. Following the request, Operation Hermes was 
implemented on 20 February.14 
 
A total of 14 Member States (including Italy) have committed resources, in the form of 
either personnel or technical equipment, and seven Member States are currently assisting 
the Italian authorities with the processing of irregular migrants. After 19 days in operation, 
Joint Operation (JO) Hermes is cooperating in Lampedusa and in immigrant detention 
centres based in Crotone (Calabria), Caltanissetta and Trapani (Sicily), and Bari 
(Puglia).15 FRONTEX also bears the cost of the flights transferring migrants to these 
centres. Last but not least, problems have arisen with France, as the French police 
started to patrol the border with Italy and refuse entry to irregular Tunisian migrants. A 
                                                 
8 La Repubblica, 7/IV/2011. 
9 http://www.anci.it/index.cfm?layout=dettaglio&IdSez=10325&IdDett=29178 (accessed 7/IV/2011). 
10 Il Manifesto, 5/IV/2011. 
11 La Repubblica, 3/IV/2011. 
12 La Repubblica, 1/IV/2011. 
13 La Repubblica, 3/IV/2011. 
14 Frontex had offered its support to the Italian government weeks earlier, but had been refused. 
15 See http://www.frontex.europa.eu/newsroom/news_releases/art102.html (accessed 4/IV/2011). 
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reception centre has been opened on the Italian side of the frontier and discussions are 
underway between the French and Italian authorities.16 
 
Relations with Tunisia are, of course, of the outmost importance to resolve the situation. 
The 15-year-old policy based on the strengthening of police and military controls on 
Tunisian shores suddenly collapsed and border patrols and the other measures of 
prevention were suspended. Repatriation policies could no longer be implemented 
because of the political instability in Tunisia. The Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs visited 
Tunisia on 14 February in order to find some common ground to implement bilateral 
agreements. However, this first visit to Tunisia failed to produce results and a second visit 
by Prime Minister Berlusconi on 3 April was followed by a meeting between officials of the 
two countries and led to a new agreement.17 
 
After signing the agreement with Tunisia on 6 April, the Italian government proposed 
providing the 22,000 Tunisian nationals who arrived between 1 January and 6 April with 
temporary humanitarian permits. It is still not clear whether they will have validity only in 
Italy or also in the rest of the EU. The issue is controversial and still under debate since 
the European position on the implementation of Directive 55/2001,18 regulating the 
granting of humanitarian permits in the case of massive arrivals of displaced people, has 
not yet been fully defined. 
 
After 6 April, repatriation procedures with Tunisia were again implemented for new arrivals 
and on the basis of the new agreements signed with the government.19 Moreover, €100 
million will be provided to the Tunisian authorities to reinforce their coastal patrols with 
new technical equipment.20 
 
A Change of Attitude 
Italy’s lack of capacity to respond to the migration emergency, especially in Lampedusa, is 
quite unexpected. The country has been involved in controlling irregular migration by sea 
since the beginning of the 90s and it has developed an ample experience on the ground. 
As far as Lampedusa is concerned, the situation of emergency is not something new. 
Large numbers of migrants have already been recorded in the past: the official number of 
migrants landed in Lampedusa ranges from 10,497 in 2004 to 31,252 in 2008. 
 
A small island with 5,000 inhabitants in the middle of the Sicily Channel, Lampedusa is 
‘traditionally’ the landfall for crossings from Libya and Tunisia. The reason is twofold: (1) it 
is the closest point to the North African shore; and (2) it has had a first-assistance facility 
for a long time. Since 2006 it was a reception and first-aid centre, where migrants stay for 
a maximum of 48 hours, before being transferred –by plane or ferry– to holding centres on 
mainland Italy. Special teams of experts (police, international organisations and NGOs) 
worked on the island providing assistance to those rescued at sea. In 2009 it was 
transformed into a centre for the identification and direct expulsion of migrants but was 
finally closed after a revolt in October 2009. All boats intercepted in the Sicily Channel 
after that date have been towed directly to Sicily. 
 
                                                 
16 La Stampa, 5/4/2011. 
17 See http://www.affarinternazionali.it/articolo.asp?ID=1722 (accessed 7/IV/2011). 
18http://www.interno.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/sezioni/sala_stampa/notizie/immigrazione/000069_201
1_04_07_informativa_Maroni_alla_Camera.html (accessed 7/4/2011). 
19 http://www.affarinternazionali.it/articolo.asp?ID=1722 (accessed 7/4/2011). 
20 La Repubblica, 6/IV/2011. 
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In 2011, rescue operations from Lampedusa have been carried out in accordance with the 
law of the sea, with great professionalism and in very difficult situations. Conversely, 
organisation after disembarkation has been a complete failure. The explanation is simple: 
the management of migrants is impossible on the island. In the absence of the necessary 
transfer facilities to the mainland, the authorities have been unable to feed or house such 
large numbers of migrants. Sanitary conditions are desperate and the mayor has 
announced that 2,000 people have been without food, while the local population has done 
all it has been able to help. 
 
At the time of Berlusconi’s visit on 30 March, 2,800 migrants were housed in the reception 
centre, which had a capacity for 850, while more than 3,000 were without proper shelter in 
camps with makeshift tents and terrible sanitation. The scarcity of food and water was 
evident. More than 250 minors, sheltered in a provisional facility, were also on the island. 
Most of them preferred to camp out of doors, sleeping on what has been called ‘the hill of 
shame’. Amnesty International has denounced a situation of sanitary emergency.21 
 
The critical situation was not the result of the landings, but of the complete lack of logistic 
support. The strategy to make it difficult to move migrants to the mainland created a panic 
in Lampedusa. Probably the intention was to increase the state of alarm and then 
organise collective expulsions directly from Lampedusa to Tunisia, as had already been 
done in 2009. 
 
Conclusion: The Italian government’s reaction to the migrant crisis can be better 
understood in the context of domestic politics. The influence of Lega Nord, the 
xenophobic political party supporting Berlusconi’s coalition, had a decisive impact on the 
initial political choices. In a northern Italian dialect, Umberto Bossi, the party leader, 
announced in the middle of the Lampedusa crisis: ‘Immigrati? Foeura de ball’ (which can 
be translated as: ‘Immigrants? Go away, piss off!’). The only feasible solution, in the 
Lega’s view, is to reject and repatriate immigrants. According to Bossi, eventually –and 
only if really necessary– migrants can be moved to holding centres in southern Italy. In 
any case they have to stay close to their homeland, in the south: if not in the southern 
Mediterranean, at least in the south of Italy. Of course, there were negative reactions to 
this view, especially from the authorities of the southern Italian provinces, such as the 
Governor of Sicily. 
 
However, the initiatives adopted to reject and expel migrants have failed as no agreement 
on repatriations has been reached with Tunisia, which refuses to contemplate collective 
deportations. Hence, Berlusconi has had to change strategy. 
 
The final decision to grant temporary permits and allow Tunisian migrants to move freely 
around Italy shows a complete change of perspective and a new-found strength in 
Tunisia’s negotiating capacity. All the efforts of the Italian government, which initially 
intended to repatriate the migrants, have been for nought. However, the management of 
undocumented migrants in Italy will be easier in the near future, as those already in Italy 
will be regularised. Consequently, the temporary holding centres will be emptied and will 
probably be used for the expected mass arrival of asylum seekers from Libya in the 
following weeks. 
 
                                                 
21 See Fulvio Vassallo Paleologo, Lampedusa, Mineo, Manduria: Detenzione arbitraria e violazione dei diritti 
dei migranti, www.meltingpot.org/articol16566.htlm (accessed 4/IV/2011). 
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It is important to remark that after Berlusconi’s visit to Tunisia and the new agreements 
with the North African country, reached on 5 April, his discourse in the media and his 
attitude towards migrants has completely changed. A much more positive vision prevails. 
Apparently the fear of an ‘invasion’ from Africa has disappeared and the aim has been to 
present a more positive image of Italy22 as a good receiving country. Humanitarian 
permits are ready to be released, and the Prime Minister has recently announced that 
everything is well in Lampedusa and that migrants have no problems with food or water. 
There are still problems to be solved with Italy’s EU partners –which are not supporting 
this initiative– but Berlusconi now recalls the country’s Catholic tradition and the centrality 
of the value of generosity to assist migrants. He makes no mention of the very severe 
criticism the government has received in the past few weeks from human rights activists in 
Italy and abroad and from part of the Roman Catholic Church. 
 
Paola Monzini 
PhD in Social and Political Sciences (IUE) and international consultant 
 
 
                                                 
22 La Repubblica, 3/IV/2011. 
